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Abstract
We continue the analysis of quantum-like description of markets and
economics. The approach has roots in the recently developed quantum
game theory and quantum computing. The present paper is devoted
to quantum bargaining games which are a special class of quantum
market games without institutionalized clearinghouses.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
1 Quantum bargaining
There have recently been important changes in the paradigms of eco-
nomics: economists discuss the role of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
[1] or even dare claim that quantum mechanics and mathematical economics
are isomorphic [2]. These shocking changes have probably been brought
about by the emergence of econophysics. Research on quantum compu-
tation and quantum information allows to extend the scope game theory
1for the quantum world [3, 4]. Among various proposed qualitative scien-
tiﬁc methods only quantum theory does not allow to take no account of
the news phenomenon so persistent in social sciences [5]. Therefore the
quantum-like description of market phenomena has a remarkable chance
of gaining favourable reception from the experts. On the other hand only
thorough investigation may reveal if economics already is in or would ever
enter the domain of quantum theory. The present authors have given a
general description of quantum market games (q-games) in a recent paper,
[6]. Among them one may distinguish the class of quantum transactions (q-
transactions) that is q-games without institutionalized clearinghouses. This
class comprises quantum bargaining (q-bargaining) which are discussed in
the present paper and quantum auction (q-auction) to be discussed in a
separate paper. The participants of a q-bargaining game will be called Al-
ice (
A)a n dB o b(
B). We will suppose that they settle beforehand who is the
buyer (Alice) and who is the seller (Bob). A two-way q-bargaining that is a
q-bargaining when the last condition is not fulﬁlled, will be analyzed in a
separate paper. Alice enter into negotiations with Bob to settle the price for
the transaction. Therefore the proper measuring apparatus consists of the
pair of traders in question. In q-auction the measuring apparatus consists
of a one side only, the initiator of the auction.
2 The Riemann sphere of polarization states
We will identify the space of Alice polarization states with the one dimen-
sional complex projective space
C
P
1.P o i n t si n
C
P
1 will be called polar-
















































































































g) will be identiﬁed. If we perform the transition
































identiﬁed with the compactiﬁed Gauss plain
C .Ap o i n t
z
2
C may in turn be
2identiﬁed with a point in the two dimensional sphere
S
2.T h i si d e n t i ﬁ c a t i o n































































3 are the Pauli matrices. The map-
ping
(2









2 of the space of polarization states but
one must remember that the superposition (addition) of polarization states
may only be performed in the Hilbert space
H










i is given by squared module
of the scalar product
(1
) of the states and may be expressed in terms of the
angle














































































Points in the Riemann sphere,
z
2
C , are in the following 1-1 correspon-






















































































I is the unit matrix. This representation is referred to as the Stokes
parametrization [8] and is the inverse one to the Cayley-Kleina parametriza-
tion
(2









A (that is of her strategy). If she formulates the conditions
of the transaction we say she has the polarization










i). In q-bargaining this means that she put forward the price.
In the opposite case, when she decides if the transaction is made or not,
we say she has the polarization
j
0
i. (She accepts or not the conditions of
the proposed transaction.) This is an analogy of the isospin symmetry in
3nuclear physics which says that nucleon has two polarization states: proton









) form an orthonormal basis in
H
s,t h e
linear hull of possible Alice polarization states. Bob’s polarization is deﬁned
in an analogous way.
3 Polarizations of q-bargaining
The states representing Alice and Bob strategies are fermions from the phys-
ical point of view. This seemingly surprising statement consist in noticing
that the transaction in question is made only if the traders have opposite
polarizations (and even that is not a guarantee of the accomplishment).
Obviously, the states of Alice and Bob became entangled if they enter






















Therefore the space of polarizations of q-bargaining is isomorphic to the




1). The homogeneous coordinates of polarizations of q-bargaining,





































































suppose that the polarization of q-bargaining is determined by the pair of
participants in a unique way.
This polarization space has a fascinating connection to Lorentzian ge-







2 may be identiﬁed with the heavenly sphere of

















) that preserves the Minkowski metric. Penrose have also shown
that the points on the heavenly sphere may be obtained from spinors so
that any point on the heavenly sphere corresponds to a proposition spec-
ifying the state of a spinor ( in the space of propositions in the quantum
























quantum cloning is not possible [9] and this makes the quantum bargain-
ing nontrivial and very interesting. It seems worth to notice that although
the polarization state cannot be cloned it may be transferred. We may by
using classical and quantum communication channels [10, 11] teleport Alice
polarization state to another q-bargaining site. In that way Alice may enter
into negotiation with Bill instead of Bob. Nevertheless, she will not be able
to accomplish both transaction simultaneously. This seems to be natural if
one recalls the common belief in undividity of attention. Alice however may
multiply her proﬁts during a ﬁxed interval by using ﬁnancial oscillators [12].
To this end she must be able to master validity times of various ﬁnancial
instruments bought or sold in q-bargaining at diﬀerent times.


















B) during q-bargaining with the polarization
j
0


























































This deﬁnition is justiﬁed by the asymmetry of proﬁts made on a deal by the






i. More detailed analysis
of possible proﬁts will be presented in the following paragraph. Of course,
if the polarizations are the same then the relation of dominance is transitive.
If we consider three parties
A,
B and
C and every pair of them enters into






































In this case there is a statistical non-quantum model [8]l e a d i n gt or e s u l t s
identical to those of the discussed here q-bargaining. However, if the polar-
izations are not constrained by cultural customs or initial agreement they































































i already known from the popular game rock, paper and scissors (RPS).
5If domination results in proﬁt asymmetry among participants (see below)
then traders buying or selling, say, shares issued by companies belonging
to Alice, Bob and Carol may be perceived as if playing an RPS game. A
quantum version of the RPS game is discussed by Iqbal and Tool [13]. They
showed that contrary to the classical case there is a stable Nash equilibrium
in the quantum RPS game. The observed non-transitivity of dominance in
bargaining is a case in point for using quantum description of bargaining.
Empirical veriﬁcation should decide if such approach is correct. Of course,
one may tray to realize q-bargaining games on quantum level where both
parties may be formed by coalitions and the appropriate states would be
superpositions of states of the members but this is beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
4 Rationality of decisions of making bargain









































B. Let us consider the following situation. Alice is
going to buy some commodity at the price







c describes the possible proﬁt if the transaction would come true. To















measures proﬁts made by Alice if the commodity bought at the price
c has
ar e a lv a l u e
c
0 to her. If on the other side Bob want to sell the commodity
at the price







Note that that the supply of an asset at the price
c may be perceived as




1. Therefore there is no minus sign in the deﬁnition of the random
variable
p. The axioms of quantum theory say that the probability density
of revealing Alice and Bob intentions described by the random variables
q
and












































A is the probability amplitude of oﬀering the price
q by Alice













B is interpreted in an analogous way. Of
6course, the ”intentions”
q and
p not always result in the accomplishment












































i. The transaction would be accomplished only if Alice pays




q. Therefore the rationality of the decision







If we change the convention so that the variable
q describes proﬁts of








0 with accordingly changed interpretation of
p.























n.T h el o g a r i t h m
of the transaction price,
l
n












i, respectively) restricted by
the condition
(5




i we have to integrate over




































































































































































































































Note that these distribution are not yet correctly normalized.
5 The case when Alice bargains with the Rest
of the World
Let us now consider the possible inﬂuence of changes in the price char-
acter of strategies of bargaining parties on their proﬁts. The analysis of
7Nash equilibrium states [16] of participants changing their polarizations via








B will be presented in
a separate work. To illustrate the course of q-bargaining and the resulting
proﬁts let us consider a simple model. Suppose that Alice state is given by
































a (therefore we call the value
e
￿
a the withdrawal price).
Let now Carol represent the Rest of the World (
R
W)s t r a t e g y[ 6]t h a ti sa
market on which the good Alice is going to buy fulﬁlls the demand-supply




















W is normal (gaussian). Choosing appropri-




p,w h e r e


























































































i). The time of waiting for accomplishment of the transaction
￿ is a
random variable with a geometrical distribution [14] and does not depend








































































￿ is the characteristic (mean) time of duration of q-bargaining [14].
Eq.
(12
) respects the time Alice needs for selling the good (also equal to
￿).






).T h ep r o ﬁ tA l i c em a d ei na








































































































































































































Figure 1: Alice proﬁt intensity in
q-bargaining with
R
W as a function of loga-












































6. If on the other
hand Rest of the World always proposes the price then Alice get the maxi-









3. This value has the property





￿ is a contraction almost every-
where) [14]. Therefore if Alice does not know the parameters of the
R
W





















a leading to self-
correcting optimal algorithm for getting the withdrawal price
a.I nt h ed i s -
























1 then any value of
a brings non-zero









0 ) any strategy with
a
<
0 results in loses. Therefore
we should not be surprised that rivalry among sellers resulted in a market
where sellers display prices to give their potential clients better bargaining
positions.
6 Temperatures of mixtures of q-bargaining
General quantum bargaining involves mixed strategies and therefore should
be described in terms of probability density matrix (operator)
￿ deﬁned








B. Cases when the polarization of q-
bargaining does not depend on mutually independent mixed strategies of









B,w h e r e
￿











polarization state of q-bargaining,
￿






































































R is the inverse of spin temperature of the







r .T h ea b o v ef o r m u l am a y






s but our convention leads to formu-
las consistent with those performed in the two-dimensional representation





). It follows from Eq.
(16












































0 in order to get unamibiguous parameterization
of the unit ball
K












2 . Strait lines joining those points with
the center cut the sphere
S







r .T h ep r o -











￿ determines for every




































￿ is the center of
K
2 but then the direction of
￿
!
r is undetermined. There is another important
quantity, namely Shannon entropy
S, that, instead of spin temperature, may






























































The present authors introduced in Ref. [14] risk temperature, being the in-
verse of Legendre multiplier
￿ . There is the following relation between the
dispersion
￿ and the risk temperature
￿
￿
1 of the discussed above demand-





















E is the economic analogue of Planck constant. In q-bargaining the
temperature of Alice strategy is zero because her strategy may be perceived
as the limit of the normal distribution with dispersion tending to zero. This
allows her to perform arbitrage. The only remedy for limiting Alice proﬁts




￿, that is the risk temperature
￿
￿
1. (A quantum-like analogue
of ﬁnancial risk behaves like energy, see the discussion in Ref. [17].) As a
result the optimal value of the parameter
a of Alice strategy will be shifted
towards zero. Alice, to correct her strategy, have to start a new iterative
procedure to ﬁnd the new optimal value of
a and this will enlarge disper-






0). This process resembles heat transfer from
a hot thermostat (
R
W) to a cold one (Alice). As a result the thermostat
R
W
cools down. Alice gets warmer and subsequently while ﬁnding new value
of
a lowers her temperature (and entropy).







) being an integral Wigner function with Gibbs
weights [6], we would get a model analogous to spin system interacting
11with phonon thermostat [18]. We envisage the investigation of q-bargaining
with methods characteristic to quantum quasi-equilibrium stochastic pro-
cesses. This should result in formulation of nonlinear equations governing
the dynamics of changes in risk and spin temperatures. But investigation of
q-bargaining without the underlying thermostat
R
W that dictates market
prices seems to be to abstract for application in economics. It is customary
that the polarization state in bargaining with the Rest of the World is ﬁxed
in advance (e.g. sellers price). Therefore nontrivial description of changes
in spin temperature of q-bargaining may be obtained only in models with
at least three parties: A, B and
R
W with A and B using diﬀerent strategies
with respect to themselves than to
R
W. Such a minimal model is four-
dimensional and describes risk temperatures of A, B and
R
W and spin
temperature of the q-bargaining between A and B.
Note that spin temperature resembles another Legendre multiplier con-
nected to portfolio managing and introduced and discussed in Ref. [19]. Such
coupled to the logarithmic rate of return portfolio temperature (third kind
of temperature of economic process!) allows to compare skills of investors
active in diﬀerent market or market conditions and not necessary during
the same intervals. For an aggressive market activity the logarithmic rate
of return cease to be additive and portfolio temperatures acquire nonzero
imaginary parts [12]. The considered above q-bargaining between Alice
and
R
W with both polarizations may be perceived as multiple buying and
selling of some ﬁnancial asset with normal distribution of quotation of log-
arithm of its price. So we are able to determine the portfolio temperature
of Alice strategy. Such thermodynamics of q-bargaining between Alice and
R
W would be presented elsewhere.
7 Final remarks
If Bill intervene in q-bargaining between Alice and Bob so that ﬁrst trans-
action is made between Alice and Bill and the second between Bob and
Bill then we may call the process complex q-bargaining between Alice and
Bob. The middlemen (e.g. Bill) are ﬁlters from the quantum mechanical
point of view. In complex q-bargaining one may give up clearing of the
intermediate transactions. This would result in superposition of amplitudes
characterizing proﬁts (logarithm of prices) and polarizations of complex q-
12bargaining.
The discussed connection between q-bargaining and condensed matter
physics suggest that q-bargaining might be performed with help of quan-
tum automata. If Penrose is right in his suggestions concerning the process
of thinking [22] the phenomenon of q-bargaining might be possible to detect
in present markets where transactions are made due to non-computational
algorithms. Does a middleman performs the role of a ”polarizator” facilitat-
ing making transactions?
If we consider more realistic market of several assets then q-bargaining









:. So q-bargaining may be
used for modeling negotiations based on multi-criterion valuation of the
oﬀer.





is more proﬁtable for Alice, that is she accepts the transaction instead of
proposing the price. Heziod writes [23] that Zeus accepting the method one
divides the other chooses in his deal with Prometheus, let the human to
divide.
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